Discussion Grounds

Luke, I woke up this morning thinking I had moved too quickly toward the suggestion that I present some of my reasons for belief. We have more points of agreement we should talk about first. One of them is this that you wrote last time:

“One tendency is to spend little time understanding the other’s position, and lots of time attacking it. This leads to straw-man arguments and mutual frustration. I hope we continue to invest heavily in understanding each other….”

The question of properly basic beliefs still seems moot for this conversation, but I don’t mind your asking me for clarification:

I’m still a bit confused. It sounds like you want to say your direct perception of God is incorrigible, but your example is misleading. If you perceive green, it is still an inferential leap to say that “there is green there [outside the window].” All that is incorrigible is to say “I perceive green.”

There is a difference in the case of God: he can impress a person with a perception that is knowledge, an awareness that is not just of the numinous, the transcendent, the other, but an awareness that is of God himself. I think we have to regard God as having that ability, if he exists, or else he would have less capacity to make himself known to his creation than his creation has. Green can incorrigibly impress itself on our awareness;¹ why would we suppose that God could not do at least as much?

As to what propositions about God are available to me in a properly basic way, I really don’t know. I am quite certain that God could make any number of propositions available to any person in a basic way. There are numerous very well attested reports of Muslims in North Africa and the Middle East having visions of Jesus Christ. These are fairly content-rich. So I must amend what I wrote earlier: “I think that theism, not Christianity, can be a properly basic belief.” I wasn’t thinking broadly enough then.

I know that when I first entered into a relationship with Christ, God gave me a strong inner knowledge that his Word was trustworthy. Since that time, I have had other occasional experiences of God giving me knowledge not based on evidence. The most striking, I think, was when I had signed up for college classes on the basis of a plan that made perfectly good sense at the time. After registering, I had a strong impression from God that I must change my schedule. I found out about two years later that if I had not changed it, the sequence would have been messed up and my graduation would have been considerably delayed.

But how much of my knowledge of God now is properly basic? As I said, I don’t know, because my knowledge of God is wrapped up in so many different things now: knowledge of Scripture, my own experiences as well as others’, and a whole lot of reading and reflection. Plantinga’s argument in 2000 was not (as I recall) that knowledge of God must be properly basic, but that knowledge of God may be warranted or justified if it is acquired in a properly basic way, that is, if one comes to knowledge of God apart from evidences. (I’ve only read through half of the 1967 book, so I won’t speak to that one.) I certainly agree with that.

You asked,

Concerning the “default view,” I’m really asking whether you think theism or atheism carries the burden of proof. You seem to think atheism carries the burden of proof because it is the less popular view. Is that correct?

I’m not sure we ought to consider either theism or atheism a “default view.” I had said before that religious belief is a default position, and that this is just a matter of empirical observation. Religious belief is not the same as theism. But we must put this in context. A while ago I wrote,

“I believe because of the convergence of a whole constellation of reasons, ranging from my experience of God, to my experience of myself and other humans, to philosophical arguments and to historical evidences.” Each one of those reasons could be individually challenged, but as these challenges multiply in number, their strength weakens rather than grows; for they comprise a set of beliefs, all of which are necessary in order to sustain an atheistic viewpoint, and many of which are implausible. The result: it takes more “faith” to be an atheist than a Christian.

And this is what you assessed as my taking the position that Christianity should be regarded as the default view, and you went on to say, “Christianity makes a long list of highly contentions claims, and it should offer support for them.” I’m certainly willing to go there with you, to offer support for these claims (contentious or otherwise).

Now to some other probable points of agreement. I think you and I probably both hold that:

1. Moral duties and values are real; that is, some things are really right and some things are really wrong.²
2. You and I have a genuine awareness or sense of responsibility relating to (at least some) moral duties and values.
3. Human consciousness is real, not illusory.
4. Humans have a persistent, one might say incorrigible, belief that we have free will.
5. Humans have a similarly incorrigible belief that we are each (in at least some sense) the same person from day to day and from beginning to end of life; there is continuity of identity.
6. Humans have a similarly persistent belief that our lives and our actions have meaning and purpose that transcends our individual selves.
7. Humans all consider there to be something wrong in our experience: that we do not experience the world in the way it “ought to be,” that we ourselves do not live up to our own expectations of ourselves, that there is something not right in the way people treat each other, that there is something awful or wrong about natural disasters, and so on.
8. Humans are unique in believing that; that although prey will try to escape predators and deer will run from fire, still no animal has anything even distantly approximating a human-like cognitive experience that it is “wrong” that predators eat prey, or that forest fires sometimes kill fawns.
9. Humans have a sense of what is or could be better about themselves and the world, and a (faulty but nonetheless real) drive to improve themselves and the world; and again, this is unique among humans.
10. Yet we have made very little if any progress in this over the past several millennia, with the perhaps dubious exception of increased technology³

Are we in agreement on this list?

I do think we’re moving at a fast clip, as you said last time. So far I’m okay with that, just because it’s an interesting conversation. I appreciate your taking part in it with me. It helps that right now I’m between major projects at work, for I won’t always have time to respond so quickly.

Regards,

Tom

1. That doesn’t mean I have to know what Green is in itself. I just have to take it that there is something there that is impressing itself on my awareness as Green, and that impression is to my mind quite incorrigible [↩]
2. Many atheists would disagree with that, but I think as a desire utilitarian you would affirm it. [↩]
3. I say “perhaps dubious” because it brings both wins and losses with it. Yes, medical advances have been marvelous. But someone recently noted that medieval poetry and song hardly ever complained of deep existential loneliness. Many other examples on both the plus and minus side could be brought forth. [↩]