Letter 6 to Thinking Christian
Tom,
Six letters already? We really raced out of the gates, didn’t we? I suspect we won’t be able to keep up this pace much longer.
I like how this discussion has developed, so let me reinforce it a bit. I want to counteract some destructive tendencies of theist-atheist debates.
One tendency is to spend little time understanding the other’s position, and lots of time attacking it. This leads to straw-man arguments and mutual frustration. I hope we continue to invest heavily in understanding each other.
These debates also tend to attract the Theist Tribe and the Atheist Tribe, each of which jeers at the other and encourages their representatives to go after “gotcha” moments or make snarky jabs. I hope you and I can avoid such temptations.
I also hope we can each pursue the truth rather than trying to “win one for the team” (or for ourselves).
I hope we can each be honest about our own ignorance. In these debates it can be tempting to imply that one’s knowledge is greater than it really is so as to win “authority points,” and so as to make a slightly larger portion of the audience think one is “winning.”
With that in mind, and before we get to a defense of your beliefs, I still need your help to clear up some ideas you presented.
You wrote that:
…as the challenges to faith multiply, they weaken rather than grow. [Let's say] we have arguments for Christian theism A, B, C, … and the corresponding objections ~A, ~B, ~C, …
…If ~A, ~B, ~C, … are independent of each other, then their cumulative probability is equal to the product of their individual probabilities. Since I think their probabilities are all less than 1, then their combined [probability] must be less than their lowest individual probability…
Granted, the probabilities of A, B, C, … are also less than 1.
I’m confused. By ~A do you mean “not-A” or do you mean “Luke’s objection to A”? For example, let’s say A is “Jesus is God,” not-A is obviously “It is not the case that Jesus is God,” and Luke’s objection to A is “a human cannot also be a god.”
In any case, I think we agree that we can assess the probability of Christianity vs. not-Christianity by comparing the multiplied probability of A, B, and C… with the multiplied probability of not-A, not-B, and not-C…
Concerning the “default view,” I’m really asking whether you think theism or atheism carries the burden of proof. You seem to think atheism carries the burden of proof because it is the less popular view. Is that correct?
Regarding the proper basicality of theistic belief, you write:
I believe I have a direct inner perception of God, and that there is knowledge just in that experience. It is not like inferring there is a laptop in front of me based on [a] mixture of perceptions consistent with the presence of said laptop. It is more like looking out the window and seeing green, and knowing there is green there. I infer the presence of trees from that perception, but I do not infer the presence of green from that perception. I just see it. I believe the perception of God is of that order.
I’m still a bit confused. It sounds like you want to say your direct perception of God is incorrigible, but your example is misleading. If you perceive green, it is still an inferential leap to say that “there is green there [outside the window].” All that is incorrigible is to say “I perceive green.” It could be the case that the green is just a sensation in your brain being generated by an alien scientist from another dimension, and that green does not exist “in the real world” anywhere around you, but you would still be correct to say “I perceive green,” and that’s why the statement “I perceive green” is incorrigible.
Are you saying your experience of God is like that? Or are you saying something else? Also, how many propositions about God do you think are available to you in a properly basic way? At what point in listing the propositions you believe about God do you switch to saying they are inferences, and not known in a properly basic way? It would probably help if you could point me to another author who has defended your view on this in depth. For example, are you defending the type of properly basic theistic belief that Plantinga defended in 1967, or the different version he defended in 2000, or something else?
In any case, it sounds like neither of us wants to make proper basicality a focus of our discussion, though I would like to at least understand what your position is. So after that perhaps we can set it aside and instead consider whether the evidence favors Christianity or atheism.
Cheers,
Luke