Letter 5 to Thinking Christian
Tom,
Why do you believe? You write:
I believe because of the convergence of a whole constellation of reasons, ranging from my experience of God, to my experience of myself and other humans, to philosophical arguments and to historical evidences.
This is probably true for most Christians, though you probably have an unusual number of philosophical arguments and historical evidences in your own constellation. I certainly had a constellation of reasons supporting my belief in God when I was a Christian. I believed because of personal experience, the witness of loving and trustworthy people in my life, the authority of the Bible, and some vague philosophical and historical arguments (I think I had read a Lee Strobel book in my youth).
But one by one, my introduction to critical thinking yanked out each of these tent pegs until the whole thing collapsed. In my case, the first to go was my assurance about the Historical Jesus. The next to go was my confidence in theological reasoning. In particular, I was disturbed by the gap between what liberal theologians called the religion of Jesus and the religion about Jesus. The next to go were my confidence in the divine inspiration of Scripture and my willingness to defend its barbaric moral values. After that I studied philosophy of religion quite a bit and one by one the common arguments for the existence of God fell apart. Finally, I was left only with my experiences of God and the witness of the good Christians around me. But I knew that if I was going to be fair and honest in my pursuit of truth, I had to admit there were millions of people of other religions who had equally convincing experiences of their own gods, and were likewise surrounded by convinced and moral believers. To say my experiences were genuine while their’s were not would just be special pleading.
Speaking of your constellation of beliefs that support your Christian worldview, you write:
Each one of those reasons could be individually challenged, but as these challenges multiply in number, their strength weakens rather than grows; for they comprise a set of beliefs, all of which are necessary in order to sustain an atheistic viewpoint, and many of which are implausible. The result: it takes more “faith” to be an atheist than a Christian.
Now this confuses me. You say that as the challenges to your faith multiply, their strength weakens rather than grows, because all these challenges are positive beliefs that must be sustained to justify atheism. First, I don’t understand why it should be the case that as challenges to Christian beliefs multiply they actually become weaker. Challenges to Christian belief need not be seen as supporting atheism. They merely undermine Christianity. And the more challenges there are to Christian beliefs, the stronger the challenge to Christianity itself.
Second, let us consider the possibility that the challenges to your Christian beliefs are not implausible.
Third, you make it sound as if Christianity is the default position. In my experience, most challenges to Christianity are not “positive” arguments against Christianity or theism, but merely a realization of how very weak the positive case for Christianity and theism are. Christianity makes a long list of highly contentions claims, and it should offer support for them. I’m not sure what the default view should be – agnosticism, maybe? – but it is most certainly not Christianity. Christianity carries a heavy burden of proof, and a “challenge” to Christianity may be only the realization that it cannot carry this burden with regard to a particular claim.
Now, about theism as a properly basic belief, you write:
The sense in which theism can be properly basic is that of a direct awareness of God… Yet there is also a related, specifically Christian experience of God through the Holy Spirit…
So then what of evidences? They are not out of the picture at all. There are appeals to history and other evidences throughout the Bible. Look at it this way: God is pure and holy, and one of the things he is incapable of is lying. The Bible purports to be his Word, so it certainly ought not to affirm what is false. It makes claims about events in history. Historical events can be studied by methods of historical inquiry. If such study showed that the events recorded in the Bible did not happen or were significantly unlikely to have happened, then I would have to conclude that what I thought was a properly basic belief was an improperly basic error. [emphasis added]
Now this is a bit different than the notion of proper basicality with which I am familiar. It sounds like you may just mean that you have a direct inner perception of God, and that you think the best explanation for this subjective phenomenon is the real existence of God. In the same way, I now have a direct visual perception of a Vostro laptop, and I think the best explanation for this subjective phenomenon is the real existence of a Vostro laptop. But your belief in the real existence of God and my belief in the real existence of the Vostro laptop are not properly basic, for they are neither axiomatic nor incorrigible.
If so, then one approach I could take would be to argue that the best explanation of my direct visual perception of a Vostro laptop is the real existence of a Vostro laptop, while the best explanation of your direct visual perception of God is not the real existence of God.
I would then argue the same thing concerning your inner perception of the Holy Spirit and his witness to you about the truth of Christian doctrines. And I would continue with other claimed evidences – the historicity of the Bible, philosophical arguments, and so on.
But you probably resist my attempt to recast your “properly basic” theistic beliefs as resulting from arguments to the best explanation. In any case, would you care to defend your notion of the proper basicality of theism, whatever it is?
I have not defended my beliefs thus far. I am happy to do so, but I won’t just start rambling. I’ll wait for your questions of me.
Cheers,
Luke
